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CONTESTING FIRM BOUNDARIES: INSTITUTIONS,
COST STRUCTURES, AND THE POLITICS OF
EXTERNALIZATION
VIRGINIA DOELLGAST, KATJA SARMIENTO-MIRWALDT, AND
CHIARA BENASSI*
This article develops and applies a framework for analyzing the
relationship among institutions, cost structures, and patterns of
labor–management contestation over organizational boundaries.
Collective negotiations related to the externalization of call center
jobs are compared across 10 incumbent telecommunications firms
located in Europe and the United States. All 10 firms moved call
center work to dedicated subsidiaries, temporary agencies, and
domestic and offshore subcontractors. A subset of the firms, how-
ever, later re-internalized call center jobs, in some cases following
negotiated concessions on pay and working conditions for internal
workers. Findings are based on 147 interviews with management
and union representatives, archival data on restructuring measures
and associated collective agreements, and wage data gathered
through collective agreements and surveys. The authors argue that
variation in outcomes can be explained by both the extent of the
cost differentials between internal and external labor and the
ease of exiting internal employment relationships, which in turn
affected patterns of contestation associated with externalization
measures.
The standard internal employment relationship has long been in declineacross advanced economies as firms externalize a range of jobs once
performed in-house to subcontractors, temporary agencies, and
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subsidiaries.1 Firm strategies to shift work across organizational boundaries
in this way have been linked to the deterioration of pay and working condi-
tions, and the weakening power and coverage of collective bargaining insti-
tutions (Lillie 2012; Holst 2014).
A central concern in employment relations research has been to analyze
how labor market and collective bargaining institutions influence these
boundary decisions. Past studies can be grouped broadly into two research
streams. First, scholars have analyzed the relationship between different
combinations of institutional arrangements and particular externalization
strategies, such as contingent employment contracts (e.g., Houseman and
Osawa 2003; Olsen and Kalleberg 2004; Liu 2015) or subcontracting
arrangements (e.g., Grimshaw and Miozzo 2006; Doellgast, Batt, and
Sørensen 2009). A second body of research has asked how labor unions and
other worker representatives influence boundary decisions through strate-
gies ranging from ‘‘cross-class coalitions’’ with core employers (Hassel 2014)
to concession bargaining in exchange for job guarantees (Flecker and Meil
2010) to campaigns to organize and extend institutional protections to
externalized groups of workers (MacKenzie 2010; Greer and Hauptmeier
2012).
These two research streams focus on different mechanisms connecting
institutional environments to the boundary strategies of firms. The first
examines how institutions at the national and company levels affect cost
structures associated with externalizing work, whereas the second asks how
and why worker representatives develop alternative strategies toward exter-
nalization decisions and then access different power resources to exert
influence over these decisions. In this article, we incorporate both of these
mechanisms into a framework for analyzing the relationship among institu-
tions, cost structures, and the political dynamics associated with labor–
management negotiations over organizational boundaries. We focus on two
principal dimensions of cost structures that differ across institutional set-
tings: the cost differential between internal and external labor, and the ease
of exiting internal employment relationships. We hypothesize that different
combinations of these two factors affect patterns of contestation between
employers and worker representatives over externalization decisions.
We demonstrate the usefulness of this framework in explaining differ-
ences in how worker representatives responded to changing boundary stra-
tegies for call center jobs, based on findings from a 10-country comparative
study of incumbent telecommunications firms. We show that unions and
works councils placed the highest strategic priority on opposing or reversing
externalization in those cases characterized both by large differences in
labor costs between internal and external labor and by high ease of exiting
1Vidal defined externalization as a ‘‘reversal of the general tendency of Fordism to internalize processes
and employment’’ (2011: 284). We use the term here to refer to the process of moving work across orga-
nizational boundaries from internal workplaces or employers to workplaces or employers that have
contract-based relationships with these firms.
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internal employment. This often resulted in significant internal concessions
aimed at reducing the labor cost advantage of externalized worker groups
in response to employer benchmarking of costs and exit threats. Past cost
structures did not fully determine outcomes, however, as unions across the
cases also sought to expand legislated and negotiated protections for these
externalized worker groups. When successful, these strategies showed the
best results in terms of both limiting the expansion of poorly regulated, low-
paid jobs and preserving pay and working conditions for internal workers.
Explaining Patterns of Contestation over Organizational
Boundary Decisions
Figure 1 illustrates our framework for analyzing how cost structures associ-
ated with externalizing work influence patterns of contestation between
labor and management over boundary decisions. The two axes in Figure 1
capture the cost-based factors associated with boundary decisions. In the
management strategy literature, the relative costs of externalizing particular
tasks or jobs compared to performing them in-house are typically argued to
be rooted either in transactions costs (Williamson 1985) or in the extent to
which externalization strategies complement distinctive firm resources or
capabilities (Argyres 1996; Lepak and Snell 1999). When institutions are
included in these efficiency-based theoretical models, they are primarily the-
orized to affect boundaries through their influence on governance costs
(Williamson 1985) or on the broader competitive strategies of firms (Hall
and Soskice 2001). In contrast, employment relations research has shown
that direct or production costs associated with alternative externalization
measures can be influenced by labor market and collective bargaining insti-
tutions at the national, industry, and company levels. We analyze two dimen-
sions of these costs: labor cost differences between internal and external
jobs, and the costs associated with exiting internal employment
relationships.
The vertical axis of Figure 1 represents the size of the gap in labor costs
between similar internal and external jobs. Past research suggests that sev-
eral characteristics of institutional settings can affect this labor cost differen-
tial. First, the strength and scope of collective bargaining arrangements can
change the wage premium enjoyed by internal workers in core firms or sec-
tors (Batt and Nohara 2009), as well as the possibility of bypassing collective
agreements using different categories of externalized work (Shire,
Scho¨nauer, Valverde, and Mottweiler 2009). Second, national legislation
provides varying degrees of protection for workers on standard and non-
standard contracts, including equal pay rules and job security provisions
(Arrowsmith 2009). A further consideration is the extent to which subcon-
tractors are able to evade compliance with labor laws. For example, research
on contract-based organizational forms in the United States (Weil 2014)
and subcontractors using posted workers in Europe (Wagner 2015) showed
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that these employers gain competitive advantage by systematically violating
minimum wage and hours standards.
The horizontal axis of Figure 1 represents the ease with which employers
can exit internal employment relationships. Institutions can influence
this ease of exit through their effects on restructuring or switching costs.
These costs are higher where legislated or negotiated job security arrange-
ments are in place or negotiated obstacles to substituting internal with
external labor exist. These include, for example, employment protection
legislation, transfer of undertakings legislation, worker consultation and
Figure 1. Predicted Effects of Labor and Restructuring Cost Structures on Patterns of
Union–Management Contestation over Externalization
Labor cost 
differences 
between 
internal and 
externalized 
workers
High
I
Moderate contestation
Worker representatives view 
externalization as a low threat 
to internal jobs because of
restricted exit but as a 
significant threat to equity 
goals because of high cost 
differentials.
Employers may seek to 
externalize to gain cost 
savings but have limited
ability to use benchmarking 
of costs to gain internal 
concessions.
II
High contestation
Worker representatives view 
externalization as a significant 
threat to internal jobs and equity 
goals because of high cost 
differentials and high ease of 
exit.
Employers may use 
benchmarking of cost differences 
with external worker groups and 
exit threats to gain internal 
concessions.
Low
Worker representatives view 
externalization as a low threat 
to internal jobs and to broader 
equity goals because of low 
cost differentials and 
restricted exit.
Employers may seek to 
externalize to gain flexibility 
but cannot use it as leverage 
for internal concessions.
Low contestation
III
Worker representatives view 
externalization as a moderate 
threat to internal jobs because of
high ease of exit but not to 
broader equity goals because of
low cost differentials.
Employers may use exit threats to 
gain labor cooperation to 
improve the productivity and 
quality of internal labor but 
cannot use externalization as 
leverage for internal concessions.
Moderate contestation
IV
Low High
Ease of exiting internal employment
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codetermination rights (Grimshaw and Miozzo 2006), and collective bar-
gaining agreements (Shire et al. 2009), including negotiated limits on the
extent and form of outsourcing (Katz, Batt, and Keefe 2002) or agency work
(Benassi 2013). Ease of exit can also be affected by the degree of employer
dependence on the skills or commitment of internal workers (Doerflinger
and Pulignano 2015). Although we might expect this dependence to differ
most significantly across job categories, institutions may also affect skills for
similar occupations, for example, through collective negotiations over work
design and training investments (Lam 2002).
This literature has helped to theorize two dimensions along which
direct or production costs associated with the externalization of similar jobs
or tasks can be expected to differ across institutional settings. As in the
transactions cost literature, however, the focus of this research has been on
analyzing the factors that change employers’ short-term ‘‘efficiency’’ consid-
erations. Broadly, management is assumed to respond to institutions
because of their effects on cost-based incentives associated with alternative
boundary strategies. In contrast, we analyze the way in which different com-
binations of these (institutionally embedded) cost factors affect patterns of
contestation between labor and management over boundary decisions. The
power and control approach to the study of boundaries in the management
strategy literature provides a good starting point for theorizing these rela-
tionships. Santos and Eisenhardt argued that organizations often adopt
boundaries that may not appear efficient in the short term but that have
long-term benefits in allowing them to maximize ‘‘strategic control over
external forces,’’ such as regulators, suppliers, or other market actors (2005:
495). They drew predominately on resource dependence theory, which
views organizations as seeking power and control in markets through
attempts to reduce the uncertainty inherent in relationships with other
organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).
This literature typically has focused on firms’ relations of dependence
with external groups or interests, based on the assumption that organiza-
tions are unitary actors (Bidwell 2012: 1622). In contrast, we include both
employers and worker representatives as major stakeholder groups within
organizations, who experience relations of power vis-a`-vis, as well as depen-
dence on, one another. Each group has distinctive interests in the longer-
term effects of boundary decisions on employment terms and conditions,
both within an organization and across internal and externalized groups of
workers. We apply this broader conception of inter- and intra-organizational
power dynamics to analyze the relationship between cost structures and
labor–management negotiations over organizational boundaries.
We hypothesize that the intersection of labor cost differences and ease of
exit will be associated with four distinct patterns of contestation over the
externalization of jobs (see Figure 1). First, when cost differences are large
between similar groups of internal and external workers and when the ease
of exiting internal employment is high or expanding, we expect to find a
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high degree of contestation over boundary decisions (Quadrant II). Under
these conditions, firms have large cost-based incentives to externalize work,
whereas workers cannot rely on negotiated or legal constraints on exit to
block externalization measures. To this end, management may simply seek
to externalize all jobs. This is not always desirable, however, particularly in
areas that can be strategically important or in which ensuring compliance
with quality standards is difficult, such as customer service.
Thus, another way in which management may try to reduce costs is to
seek concessions from the internal workforce by benchmarking workers’
pay and working conditions against those of the external workforce. This
kind of competitive benchmarking, linked to threats to internal jobs, has
been observed in a range of contexts, across the international subsidiaries
of multinational corporations (Marginson and Sisson 1996; Pulignano and
Keune 2015) and between internal and subcontracted worker groups
(Flecker, Haidinger, and Scho¨nauer 2013). We posit that employers are
most likely to use this strategy under conditions of high cost difference and
high ease of exit. To use the language of labor market segmentation theory,
externalization can more easily be used as a form of countervailing power
against labor unions or ‘‘internalized worker norms governing the wage-
effort relationship’’ (Grimshaw and Rubery 2005: 1035). Described in terms
of resource dependence theories, employers may manipulate organizational
boundaries with the aim of reducing dependence on core workers and their
representatives and/or of enhancing their power to align internal pay and
working conditions more closely with external markets (Santos and
Eisenhardt 2005).
Worker representatives also have an interest in maintaining or extending
their power to determine the conditions of employment. They are most
likely to view this power as being under direct and immediate threat when
firms can easily exit internal employment relationships and when large cost
advantages are associated with doing so. This will lead labor to contest exter-
nalization. This can take different forms, including agreeing to internal con-
cessions that bring internal pay or working conditions closer to external-
market levels, partnering with management to improve the performance of
internal workers, or organizing externalized groups to close the internal–
external cost differential through raising the market wage. These strategies
are not mutually exclusive. Research on the German metal sector showed
that the union alternated among all three of these strategies, following
labor market reforms that deregulated the use of agency work and mini-jobs
(thus decreasing their costs) (Hassel 2014; Benassi and Dorigatti 2015;
Eichhorst 2015).
In contrast, when cost differences between internal and external groups
are low and exit is restricted, employers will typically have weaker incentives
and fewer opportunities to seek changes in internal cost structures through
benchmarking or demands for concessions (Figure 1, Quadrant III). When
significant constraints on exit are present, internal workers and their
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representatives may share management’s interest in maintaining or expand-
ing market-based contracting arrangements—particularly when this pro-
vides additional flexibility. Researchers have argued that high employer
dependence on internal workers contributes to insider–outsider dynamics,
whereby unions representing core workers agree to externalization to pro-
tect their members from insecurity associated with unstable markets
(Doeringer and Piore 1971; Lautsch 2002). At the same time, we would not
necessarily expect these dynamics when the cost differences between inter-
nal and external groups of workers are also low because this outcome is typi-
cally achieved through encompassing collective bargaining and labor
market institutions (Bosch, Mayhew, and Gautie´ 2010). Under these condi-
tions, unions are less likely to view externalization as undermining solidarity
or conflicting with their equity-based goals. Thus, when constraints on exit
are high and the labor-cost differential is low, externalization should be
associated with low contestation, particularly when worker representatives
are able to represent externalized groups of workers through collective bar-
gaining. For example, Grimshaw et al. (2015: 10) found that union resis-
tance to externalization in the Swedish public sector was weak because
collective agreements harmonized the pay differences between the private
and the public sector.
Situations may also exist in which large cost differences between internal
and external labor are present but exit options are restricted, for example,
because of strong job security arrangements for the internal workforce or
the low availability of appropriate subcontractors (Figure 1, Quadrant I).
Alternatively, employers may be able to easily exit internal employment but
enjoy limited cost advantages of doing so because of either already low labor
costs for the internal workforce or encompassing institutions that establish
similar pay and working conditions across externalized jobs (Quadrant IV).
In both cases, we expect moderate conflict because employers face con-
straints on using benchmarking of costs to gain concessions but also have
either cost-based incentives or exit-based capacity for externalizing work.
Worker representatives, in turn, will adopt a range of strategies aimed either
at sustaining or further strengthening restrictions on exit, at improving the
productivity of the internal workforce, or at organizing the external groups.
This framework provides a novel means of theorizing the mechanisms
linking institutions, cost structures associated with externalization decisions,
and patterns of contestation between labor and management over these
decisions. Past research has looked at these different factors in isolation.
The original contribution of our analysis is to show the ways in which they
are related to one another. This approach allows us to develop a more com-
plete and dynamic model that can be used to explain varying outcomes at
the organizational level in different political economies. In the case studies
discussed here, we demonstrate the value of this framework in analyzing dif-
ferent patterns of contestation over the restructuring of telecommunica-
tions call center jobs.
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Case Studies and Methods
The findings in this article are based on a comparison of 10 incumbent tele-
communications firms: TDC in Denmark, TeliaSonera (TS) in Sweden,
Deutsche Telekom (DT) in Germany, A1 in Austria, France Telecom (FT)
in France, Telecom Italia (TI) in Italy, BT in the United Kingdom, AT&T
in the United States, Orange Polska (OP) in Poland, and O2 Telefo´nica
Czech Republic (O2CR) in the Czech Republic. These cases represent very
similar organizations undergoing parallel changes in markets and owner-
ship structures, but they are located in countries with distinctive labor mar-
ket and collective bargaining institutions. Table 1 presents background
information on each company.
As shown in Table 1, the cases have experienced broadly similar changes
in markets and ownership, characterized by intensified competition, declin-
ing market share, and growing pressure from private investors to increase
profits and maximize shareholder value. This has encouraged firms to
downsize employment, adopt multidivisional forms to pursue product diver-
sification (Sako and Jackson 2006), and increase the use of outsourcing and
contingent employment contracts (Holst 2014). In this article, we focus on
one area of work that has been significantly affected by these developments:
call centers responsible for customer contact in the sales, service, billing,
and technical support areas. Labor-intensive call center work is increasingly
mobile because of declining information and communications technology
costs. Moreover, it can be performed cheaply by domestic and offshore sub-
contractors in the growing international outsourcing industry (Taylor and
Bain 2004; Batt, Holman, and Holtgrewe 2009).
At each company, we conducted semistructured interviews (147 in total)
with managers and worker representatives. The interviews were conducted
both by phone and face-to-face; in most cases, the interviews were held in
the native language of the interview partners.2 We also distributed a survey
to union and works council representatives at each organization that
included standardized questions concerning collective bargaining institu-
tions, negotiations over and outcomes associated with restructuring mea-
sures, and pay structures for call center jobs.3 The interviews were
transcribed and, together with site visit notes, coded using the qualitative
data-analysis software atlas.ti. Interview findings were then analyzed by
grouping quotations by codes, preparing comprehensive reports for each
case, and then comparing emergent themes across the cases. Finally, we
produced a report summarizing our findings, which was both sent to all
individuals interviewed and presented at a dissemination conference
2At TDC and TS, interviews were conducted in English; at O2CR, they were conducted through an
interpreter.
3In Denmark, management provided data on pay structures because unions did not have an overview
of pay across locations; in the other countries, union representatives provided these data from the survey,
supplemented by collective agreements. The survey questionnaire is available on the Academia.com pro-
file of the authors.
558 ILR REVIEW
T
ab
le
1.
B
ac
kg
ro
un
d
on
th
e
C
as
e
St
ud
ie
s
C
om
pa
ny
C
ou
nt
ry
T
ot
al
em
pl
oy
ee
s
20
10
Ye
ar
of
fir
st
pu
bl
ic
sh
ar
e
of
fe
ri
ng
Ye
ar
fu
lly
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
or
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
st
at
e
ow
ne
rs
hi
p
Ye
ar
m
ar
ke
t
lib
er
al
iz
ed
(f
ix
ed
-li
ne
se
gm
en
t)
M
ar
ke
ts
ha
re
(f
ix
ed
-li
ne
se
gm
en
t)
20
10
–2
01
1
U
ni
on
de
ns
ity
*
T
D
C
D
en
m
ar
k
9,
20
0*
*
19
94
19
98
19
96
67
%
*
*
75
%
T
el
ia
So
n
er
a
(T
S)
Sw
ed
en
8,
93
7*
*
20
00
51
%
19
93
59
%
*
*
85
%
A
1
A
us
tr
ia
9,
71
7*
*
20
02
28
%
19
98
55
%
*
*
65
%
D
eu
ts
ch
e
T
el
ek
om
(D
T
)
G
er
m
an
y
12
3,
17
4*
*
19
95
32
%
19
98
52
%
*
*
55
%
Fr
an
ce
T
el
ec
om
(F
T
)
Fr
an
ce
10
2,
55
2*
*
19
97
27
%
19
98
51
%
*
*
N
/A
T
el
ec
om
It
al
ia
(T
I)
It
al
y
57
,9
94
*
*
19
97
20
03
19
97
56
%
*
*
26
%
a
B
T
U
K
79
,8
00
*
*
19
84
19
93
19
90
39
%
*
*
90
%
A
T
&
T
U
SA
14
3,
89
8*
*
*
18
85
18
85
19
96
40
%
*
*
*
88
%
O
2
T
el
ef
o´n
ic
a
C
ze
ch
R
ep
ub
lic
(O
2C
R
)
C
ze
ch
R
ep
ub
lic
7,
11
4*
*
19
95
20
05
20
01
60
%
*
*
38
%
O
ra
n
ge
Po
ls
ka
(O
P)
Po
la
n
d
25
,6
87
*
*
19
98
20
10
20
03
57
%
*
*
25
%
So
ur
ce
s:
*
U
n
io
n
su
rv
ey
s;
*
*
E
ur
op
ea
n
C
om
m
is
si
on
(2
01
0)
;*
*
*
St
at
is
ta
(2
01
4)
.
N
ot
es
:N
/A
,n
ot
av
ai
la
bl
e.
a T
I
m
em
be
rs
h
ip
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
is
h
ig
h
er
th
an
re
po
rt
ed
h
er
e
be
ca
us
e
th
is
fi
gu
re
do
es
n
ot
in
cl
ud
e
m
em
be
rs
of
th
e
U
n
io
n
e
It
al
ia
n
a
de
lL
av
or
o
(U
IL
)
an
d
U
n
io
n
e
G
en
er
al
e
de
l
L
av
or
o
(U
G
L
).
attended by interviewees. We also presented it at several meetings organized
by national and international unions representing telecommunications
workers (Doellgast, Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, and Benassi 2013). The responses
of representatives from the case study firms to the report and at confer-
ences helped us to correct errors of fact and to confirm the resonance of
our comparative analysis with stakeholder experience.
Case Study Comparison
Our comparison of the cases proceeds in three parts. First, we summarize
the boundary strategies adopted by the 10 case study firms. Second, based
on our framework (Figure 1), we compare the two dimensions of cost sav-
ings and ease of exit associated with these strategies across the 10 cases. We
demonstrate the value of our framework in explaining different patterns of
labor–management contestation in four cases corresponding to its ideal-
typical quadrants, as well as alternative outcomes in terms of re-
internalization and concessions. Third, we examine the role of worker rep-
resentatives in seeking to shift these cost structures through organizing stra-
tegies aimed at closing gaps in regulation and at improving pay and
working conditions for externalized groups.
Boundary Strategies of the Case Study Firms
The case study firms externalized call center work through four alternative
strategies: ownership of dedicated call center subsidiaries, use of temporary
agencies to staff internal call centers, domestic subcontracting, and offshore
subcontracting. The shift of work to call center subsidiaries is a partial form
of externalization; although these subsidiaries are still owned by the incum-
bent firms, they typically are organized as internal subcontractors, responsi-
ble for selling call center services to their parent company and, in some
cases, to other companies.
Figure 2 illustrates the proportion of work externalized through each of
these strategies by each firm around 2010. TDC, DT, TI, and OP moved call
center work to dedicated subsidiaries, with all consumer-segment call center
jobs at DT and OP located in these subsidiaries. TDC, TS, A1, BT, OP, and
O2CR used moderate to high numbers of agency staff in their internal call
centers; DT, FT, and TI used small numbers of agency staff; and AT&T did
not use temporary agencies. Those companies that relied on moderate to
high levels of subcontracting (20 to 50% of jobs) primarily used either
domestic subcontractors (DT and TI) or offshore subcontractors (FT, BT,
and AT&T). TDC, TS, A1, and OP did not subcontract (in this time
period), and O2CR subcontracted fewer than 10% of jobs.
Table 2 compares major changes in organizational boundary strategies,
covering the 10-year period from 2005 to 2015. This shows that seven of the
companies moved jobs that had been externalized back in-house. In four of
these cases—TDC, DT, BT, and AT&T—these changes were associated with
560 ILR REVIEW
negotiated concessions by unions and other worker representatives aimed
at re-internalizing call center jobs or preventing further outsourcing. The
remaining three cases—TS, TI, and FT—show more minor or no
concessions.
The variation observed across the cases in the extent and form of exter-
nalization can be attributed in part to distinctive combinations of labor and
restructuring cost structures in different institutional settings. For example,
TDC was historically able to pay agency workers lower wage rates than its
internal staff because agencies were covered by lower-cost collective agree-
ments. In contrast, at DT, outsourcing call center work offered more signifi-
cant cost savings because agency workers were covered by equal pay rules
but subcontractors had much lower pay rates because of very low bargaining
coverage and no national minimum wage. Constraints on exit from internal
employment relationships could also affect the form of externalization. DT
initially faced significant short-term constraints from job security and loca-
tion security agreements. Nevertheless, management was able to shift call
center jobs into lower-cost subsidiaries, in some cases later selling these sub-
sidiaries. O2CR represents a contrasting case in which weak job security
allowed the company to externalize by downsizing its call center workforce
while simultaneously increasing its use of temporary agencies, some of
which hired former O2CR workers. These types of institutionally influenced
Figure 2. Estimated Percentages of Employees Externalized in Call Centers (Consumer
Segment), 2010–2012
Sources: Management and union interviews.
Notes: These figures are based on estimates provided by interviewees, who differed in their ability to give
precise numbers of jobs externalized in each category. The reference year differs among the cases but is
roughly in the 2010 to 2012 period. The percentage subcontracted at TI is a conservative estimate, with
up to 70% of call volume subcontracted in some areas of work. Temporary agency workers at DT, TI,
and OP were used in the subsidiaries, whereas those at other companies were used in internal call cen-
ters. The figures for percentage subcontracted at FT, BT, and AT&T include both domestic and offshore
subcontracting.
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Table 2. Changes in Organizational Boundaries (2005–2015) and Associated
Changes in Pay and Conditions for Internal Workers
Company
Measures to re-internalize work, halt
externalization plans, or significantly expand
externalization
Associated changes in pay and conditions for
internal workers, sought or secured in
negotiations
TDC 1) 2011: All temp agency workers made
permanent
2) 2012–2013: Management agreed to
halt outsourcing plans
3) 2014–2015: Management outsourced
50% existing call center workforce
1) Unpaid lunches and reduced terms
and conditions for new hires/
internalized temps
2) Flexible working time model
introduced
3) Management sought further
concessions on pay for lunches and
breaks, reduced pensions, and cuts
in overtime pay to halt planned
outsourcing; when union did not
agree, outsourcing was carried out
TeliaSonera 2013–2015: Temp agency workers
reduced from . 30% to 18% of
workforce
None
Deutsche Telekom 1) 2007: Management agreed not to
outsource new subsidiary
2) 2012–2014: Subcontracting reduced
from 40 to 30%; percentage of
temporary agency employment
reduced; internal employment
stabilized
1) Pay reduced by 30% for new hires
and working time increased for
existing workers; more variable pay;
weekend work introduced
2) Flexible working time model
introduced; part-time work
increased; more intensive
performance monitoring allowed
A1 None N/A
France Telecom 2010–2012: Amount of work outsourced
declined with declining call volume
None
Telecom Italia 1) Mid-2000s: 1,350 workers from a
subcontractor moved to TI
subsidiary; freelancers converted to
training, probation, part-time, and
temporary agency contracts
2) 2008–2012: All temporary agency
workers in subsidiary made
permanent
1) Slightly lower initial pay grades for
internalized temporary agency
workers
2) Internalized workers on part-time
contracts progressively moved into
full-time contracts
BT 1) 2007: Some temporary agency
workers made permanent
2) 2011: Management agreed to
internalize 600–900 offshored jobs
1) New pay grade with less favorable pay
and conditions for internalized
temporary agency workers
2) New pay grade with less favorable pay
and conditions for jobs created
through in-sourcing
AT&T 2007–2013: 3,600 offshore jobs
internalized
New pay grade with less favorable pay
and conditions for jobs created
through in-sourcing
O2 Telefo´nica
Czech Republic
None N/A
Orange Polska None N/A
Note: N/A, not applicable.
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cost factors exerted some influence over boundary strategies at each of the
firms.
As the comparison in Table 2 shows, however, these boundary strategies
could change over time, often following negotiations between management
and worker representatives. This raises further questions concerning the
political dynamics associated with these negotiations. Why in a subset of
companies were boundary decisions a central focus of collective bargaining,
with agreements to re-internalize work or to halt further externalization,
whereas in others they were not? Why did some of these agreements involve
significant concessions on pay and working conditions for internal workers,
but in other cases these agreements involved no concessions? We argue that
these differences can be explained by analyzing how different combinations
of labor and restructuring cost structures influenced patterns of labor–
management contestation over boundary decisions.
Comparing Contestation over Boundaries
We apply our framework, illustrated in Figure 1, to explain the observed var-
iation in patterns of contestation across the cases. We first classify each case
as low, moderate, or high along the two axes in Figure 1: cost savings associ-
ated with externalization and ease of exiting internal employment (see
Table 3).
The classification of cost differences is based on data on pay levels for
similar groups of internal and externalized workers, gathered through the
union surveys and interviews (see also Figure 4, later in the article) and also
on qualitative findings concerning differences in broader terms and condi-
tions of employment. Cost differences were predominately affected by five
factors: internal pay distribution, the presence and scope of equal-pay rules
for temporary agencies, bargaining coverage and strength for domestic sub-
contractors, availability of offshore subcontractors, and the presence of cen-
tralized collective bargaining in incumbent firms that extended the pay and
working conditions negotiated for traditional core workers to call center
subsidiaries. Thus, for example, TS faced lower cost differences between
internal and externalized workers than TDC because of more compressed
internal pay, stronger equal-pay rules for temporary agency workers in
Sweden, and higher bargaining coverage for subcontractors. FT, BT, and
AT&T are classified as having high cost differences because they had access
to a significant market of offshore services in English-speaking Asian coun-
tries and French-speaking African countries, offering cost savings of
between 30% and 75%. At TI, O2CR, and OP, cost differences are classified
as moderate because internal pay rates were relatively compressed and
because (particularly at TI) some institutional protections improved the pay
and working conditions for major categories of externalized workers.
The classification of ease of exit from internal employment relationships
is based on consideration of legislated and negotiated employment
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Table 3. Comparison of Cost Structures Associated with Externalization
Company
Cost difference between internal and
externalized workers
Ease of exit from internal employment
relationships
TDC HIGH
Equal pay rules for temporary agency
workers allowed lower pay if
covered by collective agreement
Decentralized bargaining allowed
wage differentiation in call center
and other subsidiaries
Minority of subcontractors covered by
a sectoral or company-level
collective agreement
MODERATE
Weak legislated employment
protections
Negotiated employment protections
increased costs associated with
downsizing; stronger protections
covered former civil servants (35%
of workforce)
Worker transfer to subcontractors
moderately used
TeliaSonera LOW
Equal pay rules and high bargaining
coverage for temporary agencies
Majority of subcontractors covered by
a sectoral agreement establishing
minimum pay and working
conditions
HIGH
Strong negotiated employment
protections in the past; however,
employer unilaterally exited from
these agreements in 2008
Worker transfer to subcontractors
widely used
Deutsche Telekom HIGH
Equal pay rules and collective
bargaining for temporary agencies
Decentralized bargaining at DT
allowed wage differentiation in
call center subsidiaries
Very low bargaining coverage for
subcontractors, with no national
minimum wage (before 2015)
MODERATE
Strong legislated employment
protections and job security in
collective agreements; some civil
servants with very strong
protections (35% of workforce)
Works councils have codetermination
rights over dismissal decisions
Worker transfer to subcontractors
widely used
A1 LOW
Equal pay rules and collective
bargaining for temporary agencies
All subcontractors covered by a
sectoral agreement establishing
minimum pay and conditions
LOW
Strong legislated employment
protections and job security in
collective agreements; high
proportion of civil servants with
very strong protections (60%)
Works councils have consultation
rights over dismissal decisions
France Telecom HIGH
Equal pay rules and collective
bargaining for temporary agencies
Majority of subcontractors covered by
a sectoral agreement establishing
minimum pay and working
conditions at national minimum
wage
Availability of offshore subcontractors
with very low labor costs
LOW
Strong legislated employment
protections and job security in
collective agreements; high
proportion of civil servants with
very strong protections (70%)
Telecom Italia MODERATE
Equal pay rules for temporary
agencies, but based only on
sectoral agreement (not higher-
paid company agreement)
MODERATE
Strong legislated employment
protections, strong job security in
collective agreements
Negotiated limits on percentage of
(continued)
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protections or job security agreements, as well as other arrangements that
limited exit, such as civil servant status and consultation or codetermination
rights of works councils. In addition, three case study firms—TDC, TS, and
DT—outsourced significant numbers of jobs in different areas through the
transfer of workers to subcontractors. This represents a particular form of
exit that allowed these firms to bypass other negotiated or legislated employ-
ment protections.
We classify the ease of exit as low, moderate, or high based on the
strength of the negotiated or legal limits on downsizing or moving jobs,
Table 3. Continued
Company
Cost difference between internal and
externalized workers
Ease of exit from internal employment
relationships
High bargaining coverage for
domestic subcontractors, but they
could choose lower-cost
agreements and use cheaper
freelance contracts
Decentralized bargaining at TI
allowed wage differentiation in
call center subsidiary
temporary agency work
BT HIGH
Equal pay rules for temporary
agencies introduced in 2011 but
could be bypassed using pay
between assignment contracts
Availability of offshore subcontractors
with very low labor costs
MODERATE
Moderate legislated employment
protections, moderate job security
in collective agreements
Agreed limits on percentage of
offshored and temporary-agency
workers
AT&T HIGH
No equal-pay rules for temporary
agencies or collective agreements
for subcontractors
Decentralized bargaining at AT&T
allowed wage differentiation in
call centers with lower-tier
agreements
Availability of offshore subcontractors
with very low labor costs
HIGH
Weak legislated employment
protections, relatively weak job
security in collective agreements
Negotiated limits on offshoring and
practices to replace domestic
workers; however, employer used a
range of strategies to get around
these rules
O2 Telefo´nica
Czech Republic
MODERATE
Equal-pay rules for temporary
agencies but did not cover flexible
benefits
No collective bargaining for
subcontractors
HIGH
Weak legislated and negotiated
employment protections
Orange Polska MODERATE
No equal pay for temporary agencies,
pay 30–60% less
Central collective agreement
extended to call center subsidiary
HIGH
Weak legislated and negotiated
employment protections; however,
some job security protections for
call center subsidiary
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which affected restructuring or switching costs associated with externalizing
work. For example, A1 and FT both had a low ease of exit because of high
proportions of civil servants with lifetime job security in addition to rela-
tively strong legislated employment protections. TDC is classified as moder-
ate because it had high downsizing costs associated with both a relatively
generous notice period and retraining provisions in addition to some stron-
ger employment protections for former civil servants. TS is classified as high
because management unilaterally exited similar job security agreements in
2008. BT faced moderate constraints on exit because of job security agree-
ments committing management to retrain workers and place those whose
jobs had been cut in other parts of the company. BT’s union had also nego-
tiated agreements limiting the percentage of work offshored and handled
by temporary agencies, which were relatively transparent and easy for the
union to police. Although AT&T also had negotiated limits on offshoring,
the company was able to bypass these agreements because of multiple bar-
gaining units and poorly coordinated collective agreements with widely vary-
ing terms and conditions. These examples illustrate the way in which ease
of exit was influenced not only by formal agreements and laws but also by
the capacity of employers to avoid or exploit loopholes in these institutions.
Figure 3 illustrates how each case maps on to Figure 1, using the classifi-
cation developed in Table 3. Four cases broadly conform to our ideal-typical
quadrants in the framework: FT (Quadrant I), AT&T (Quadrant II), A1
(Quadrant III), and TS (Quadrant IV). The other cases have intermediate
positions on at least one of the two axes.
At AT&T, cost savings associated with externalization and the ease of exit-
ing internal employment relationships were both high. The pay at subcon-
tractors, which have no collective bargaining in the United States, was
significantly lower than at AT&T’s internal call centers, with a difference of
Figure 3. Comparison of Cases Using Framework in Figure 1
Labor cost
differences 
between 
internal and 
externalized 
workers
High
I
France 
Telecom
BT
TDC
Deutsche Telekom
II
AT&T
Moderate Telecom Italia
O2 Czech 
Republic
Orange Polska
Low
A1
III
TeliaSonera
IV
Low Moderate High
Ease of exiting internal employment
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up to $13/hour. In addition, work could be offshored to destinations such
as India or the Philippines, where wages were a fraction of those paid in the
United States. Beyond these wage differences, benefits (including most
notably health insurance) added to the cost of internal workers.
Ease of exit in the United States is high overall because of weak legislated
employment protections. AT&T’s collective agreements with the
Communication Workers of America (CWA) included some restrictions on
subcontracting. However, AT&T was able to sidestep these provisions by
using loopholes in the agreements and by adopting complicated restructur-
ing measures that made verifying whether management was complying with
their terms difficult for the union. The presence of multiple bargaining
units across AT&T exacerbated this problem because workers could be
moved across regions and collective agreements that had different provi-
sions regarding outsourcing. Union representatives observed that manage-
ment also offered generous redundancy plans ‘‘to eliminate certain whole
titles’’ and shift the work to subcontractors (interview, CWA representative,
06/05/13).
Under these conditions, outsourcing was strongly contested by the CWA.
The lack of a bargaining presence in subcontractors, along with the low
union density overall in the United States, meant that organizing the exter-
nalized workers was not viable. Instead, the union sought to both increase
costs of exit and reduce the cost disadvantage of the internal workforce.
‘‘Our contract actually says, when you’re going to do any contracting you’re
supposed to notify the union the intents of that. But the intent was for me
to come up with alternatives, maybe the union can come up with ideas on
how to help them meet that need [in terms of finding cost savings in-
house]’’ (interview, CWA representative, 03/14/12).
In one example of these strategies, the CWA formed a joint committee
with management in 2001 to 2004 whose aim was to narrow the cost differ-
ential between internal and offshored call center work. This resulted in pro-
posals to create a new job title for employees handling lower-revenue work
and to allow temporary work. In addition, a pilot project was proposed that
reduced absenteeism and improved productivity through job rotation and
flexible scheduling. Then in 2004 contract negotiations, the CWA sought an
agreement to in-source 3,000 digital subscriber line (DSL) help-desk jobs
that had been offshored to Accenture in India. Management agreed to
bring this work back to the United States, in CWA-represented call centers,
when the contract with Accenture expired in 2007—but only on the condi-
tion that the union negotiate a ‘‘competitive’’ set of conditions for the work.
The work was internalized to five new call centers under a new job title in
the Internet Services Agreement, with starting pay of close to $10/hour. By
2013, 15 of these Internet Services call centers had been set up, employing
3,600 workers, and average pay had increased to $14/hour.
The union adopted a range of strategies in negotiations with AT&T over
boundary decisions, and it consistently contested externalization with the
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objective of bringing jobs back in-house. The main means of doing so tar-
geted reducing the cost disadvantages of the unionized workforce through
concessions and a partnership whose aim was to improve the productivity of
internal workers. Management was able to use the benchmarking of costs to
gain these agreements, arguing for the need to introduce pay and working
conditions that were competitive with external, market-based labor costs. At
the same time, the union was able to resist direct concessions for existing
workers and to gain some improvements in pay and working conditions
over time for workers covered by the second-tier agreements.
A1 in Austria typifies the opposite set of conditions, in which both the
cost differences between internal and external labor, and the ease of exiting
internal employment were relatively low. A1 hired almost all new call center
staff on temporary agency contracts. Nearly 70% of the call center work-
force was on these contracts, which were often renewed indefinitely, with
some workers remaining in this status for decades. These temporary work-
ers, however, were entitled to the same employment terms and conditions
as the permanent internal workforce because of strong equal-pay and treat-
ment provisions in the national law and collective agreements. A1 still
gained some savings, primarily because of the lower dismissal costs com-
pared to the permanent workforce, as well as less generous pensions and
benefits. Nevertheless, the labor-cost differential was significantly smaller
than that associated with outsourcing or offshoring at AT&T. Other poten-
tial forms of externalization also offered lower cost savings because of
Austria’s more encompassing collective bargaining institutions. Centralized
bargaining over pay and working conditions at call center subcontractors, at
A1, and in the telecommunications sector guaranteed relatively standar-
dized pay rates for equivalent jobs. For language reasons, offshoring is also
not as readily available to Austrian as to U.S. firms.
In addition, management’s ability to exit internal employment was signifi-
cantly restricted by the large proportion of civil servants at A1, who enjoyed
lifetime job security. Nearly 60% of the workforce had this civil-servant sta-
tus in the mid-2010s. In addition, job-security provisions in collective agree-
ments, relatively strong legislated employment protections, and works
council oversight in dismissal decisions raised the restructuring costs associ-
ated with downsizing or relocating jobs. Although management was able to
reduce internal employment over time, typically relying on voluntary redun-
dancy or retirements, it was not able to quickly and unilaterally exit its inter-
nal employment relationships.
These conditions led to a situation of low labor–management conflict
over externalization measures at A1. Management was not able to bench-
mark costs between external and internal groups of workers to argue for
concessions because these cost differences were marginal. In addition,
external workers were not widely perceived as undermining standards
because they were covered by strong institutional and negotiated protec-
tions. In interviews, worker representatives noted that they were not happy
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with the high use of agency work, particularly the practice of keeping work-
ers on these contracts for long periods of time: ‘‘For me, this is not satisfac-
tory, because I think it’s sick that you need agency workers at all, but when
you’re in the stock market, financially driven, it looks better, as though you
were slimmer’’ (interview, A1 works councilor, 10/26/11). At the same
time, the union and works council were able to represent agency workers’
interests, organizing them to join the union and intervening on their behalf
in employment disputes. In one case described by the works councilor cited
above, a temporary worker was dismissed ‘‘because management did not
like him,’’ and the works council succeeded in getting him reinstated.
FT and TS are classified as different types of mixed cases. FT had a high
proportion of civil servants—around 70% in 2012—which, together with
the strong national employment protections in France, effectively made dis-
missing internal workers impossible. At the same time, cost differences
between internal and external labor could be significant. In 2010, FT oper-
ated around 20 internal call centers (14,000 workers) and subcontracted
with 20 external call centers (6,000 workers), around half of which were
located in Morocco and Senegal. Call center subcontractors in France are
covered by a sectoral agreement that sets the minimum salary at the
national minimum wage. This was only 12% lower than the starting salaries
at FT’s call centers in the early 2010s, but the overall labor costs were lower
because of higher turnover (and thus a larger percentage of workers at the
starting salary level), a large proportion of part-time workers, and less gener-
ous pensions and other benefits. A much larger gap existed between inter-
nal and offshored workers; management estimated that labor costs in the
offshore call centers were on average 75% lower than those in the in-house
call centers (interview, FT manager, 08/03/10), with typically no union
representation.
Under these conditions, FT had relatively strong cost-based incentives to
externalize work, but the firm also had strong constraints on exiting inter-
nal employment relationships. Management initially responded by adopting
a series of draconian internal restructuring measures, with the explicit aim
of increasing voluntary resignations (Diehl and Double´t 2010). This was
halted after a wave of suicides at the company gained widespread negative
media attention. Unions were critical of outsourcing and had formed a
committee within the company’s ‘‘economic commission’’ to consult on this
practice, with the aim of gaining commitments to reduce the volume of
work outsourced. One union representative described a long process of try-
ing to get information on the volume of work outsourced and associated
costs. They succeed in gaining access to outsourcing data by convincing
management they were committed to working with them to internalize jobs
under good conditions: ‘‘This is really something that we won. It took time,
it took a lot of confidence. We had to say to them: no, we will not use this to
embarrass you in front of your competitors or create difficulties in the press.
We want to use it because we think that employees are better inside the
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Group [FT], that they are treated better when they are employees of the
Group than when they are subcontracted outside of the group. That is the
reality’’ (interview, Confe´de´ration ge´ne´rale du travail [CGT] representative,
06/30/10).
Indeed, FT reduced the volume of call center work outsourced in the late
2010s; however, managers and union representatives attributed this to
declining call volumes. Cutting outsourcing was the easiest adjustment strat-
egy because of the high costs associated with downsizing. Although the FT
unions sought to reduce outsourcing (as did unions in all the case studies),
they did not place a high priority on this in negotiations or when using
direct action and protests. Notably, the unions did not seek to make conces-
sions to reverse outsourcing, nor did management use the benchmarking of
costs between internal and externalized workers to argue for changes in
internal pay and working conditions.
At TS, similar to A1, the labor cost differences were low between internal
and external workers because of encompassing legislation and collective
bargaining. Temporary agency workers are covered by strong equal-pay and
-treatment rules as well as by collective agreements, with high union density
in this sector overall. In addition, most major call center subcontractors are
signatories to their industry’s sectoral collective agreement and have strong
local union representation. Union representatives estimated that the pay
difference between call center workers at TS and at major subcontractors
was between 2,000 and 5,000 krona/month, which amounts to $1.40 to
$3.40/hour lower base pay. However, subcontractors also typically had a
higher sales-commission component that narrowed this gap. In addition,
the broader terms of the collective agreements were similar, with some
stronger provisions in the call center agreement. These included, for exam-
ple, prohibitions on split schedules.
At the same time, restrictions on exit at TS were low. The unions had
negotiated past collective agreements giving redundant employees a gener-
ous package of benefits, which ensured no involuntary dismissals and gave
employees three years to find new jobs within or outside the company. In
2008 management unilaterally ended this agreement and announced a
major restructuring plan involving a large number of redundancies. In addi-
tion, TS transferred close to 11,000 technical and business service employ-
ees to subcontractors between 2001 and 2007. This demonstrated to the
union and workforce the ease with which management could use downsiz-
ing and employee transfers to exit internal employment relationships.
The relatively small differences in pay between internal and external jobs
meant that management could not easily use the benchmarking of these
costs to demand pay concessions. Because externalized workers were cov-
ered by collective agreements, the union did not view externalization as a
major threat to broader equity goals or to sustaining union membership. At
the same time, union representatives at TS were concerned with the expan-
sion of subcontracting and temporary agency work in different time
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periods, and they tried to encourage re-internalization whenever possible.
Around 2,000 call center employees were transferred to subcontractors
between 1998 and 1999, when the company went through a major consoli-
dation of its call center operations. TS continued to use the subcontractors
for several years but gradually replaced them with temporary agency work-
ers. By 2011, 40% of the workforce in customer service jobs and 30% in
sales or support jobs were on temporary contracts. The union sought to
convince management to internalize these workers, using the business case
that the permanent workforce’s customer service quality and productivity
were higher: ‘‘3-4 years ago we had perhaps a thousand or more by
Manpower for instance. We of course wanted them to be employed by the
company. [...] we said, employ them in-house instead. I think they, the man-
agement, decided to do that because they noticed that the quality that they
get from the employees was bigger if they are employed by us [...]. The
company said: we are getting much higher customer satisfaction if we
employ them ourselves, even if it costs a little bit more’’ (interview,
Unionen representative, 10/27/14). By 2015, the proportion of temporary
agency workers in TS’s call centers had declined from more than 30 to 18%
as more of these workers were shifted to permanent contracts.
This comparison illustrates that different combinations of labor and
restructuring cost structures can have a significant impact on patterns of
labor–management contestation over boundaries. Although some contesta-
tion occurred in all four cases, the AT&T case stands out for both the high
strategic priority the union placed on limiting or reversing outsourcing and
the size of its concessions.
The Relationship between Wage Differentials and Concessions
In four of the cases—TDC, DT, BT, and AT&T—worker representatives
negotiated significant concessions in exchange for agreements to reverse
externalization or halt outsourcing plans (see Table 2). These cases had in
common a large cost differential between internal and external labor and a
moderate to high ease of exit. This suggests that these cost differences are
particularly important for understanding the political dynamics of conces-
sion bargaining over externalization. A closer examination of pay structures
across the firms provides further support for this argument. Figure 4 illus-
trates the starting, typical, and top pay levels for in-house call centers, call
center subsidiaries or second-tier contracts, and subcontractors for which
these figures were available. We include pay levels for agency workers when
these rates were allowed to deviate from those for equivalent permanent
jobs. At A1 and O2CR, we have pay figures only for the in-house call cen-
ters. We were not able to obtain pay data from OP.
As Figure 4 shows, TDC, DT, BT, and AT&T are distinctive in having very
high pay for their in-house call center workers relative to the call centers in
other European countries. The other case study companies had lower and/
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or more compressed pay scales for in-house staff and smaller differences
compared to pay rates for the externalized groups of workers. In addition,
concessionary or second-tier agreements had the effect of lowering the pay
levels in these four cases (at least for some groups of internal workers) to
levels closer to the external market in each country. TDC’s subsidiary Call
Center Europe had pay rates similar to those at subcontractors. DT’s call
center subsidiary DTKS, BT’s new lower-tier job titles, and AT&T’s new call
centers under the Internet Services Agreement all paid from 30 to 50% less
than the level in past agreements. All of these agreements were strongly
Figure 4. Comparison of Hourly Pay Levels for Call Center Workers (Customer Service and
Sales, Consumer Segment) in U.S. Dollars, Based on Purchasing Power Parity, 2011–2012a
Sources: Collective agreements, management and union surveys, and interviews.
Notes: Comparison categories for each case include: in-house, subsidiaries and new pay grades (when
present), subcontractors (when used), and temporary agencies (when used and when pay was allowed to
deviate from in-house pay). Employees were no longer hired onto the AT&T Southwest reported ‘‘start-
ing salary.’’ We do not have figures for the top salary at A1; however, the typical salary is close to the top
of the pay scale. Temporary agency workers at TS, DT, A1, FT, and TI were on the same pay scale as per-
manent workers, but they were typically paid close to the starting salary level. The in-house pay rates at
DT (2006) no longer apply because all call center workers were moved onto a lower pay scale at the
DTKS subsidiary.
aExcept for DT pay levels in-house (2006).
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influenced by employer benchmarking of labor costs and terms of collective
agreements or individual contracts for similar externalized call center jobs.
This further supports our argument that when the cost differences
between internal and externalized labor were larger, employers were more
likely to seek and to secure concessions that reduced the internal workers’
pay and working conditions to the level of the external market. At the same
time, worker representatives across our cases also adopted a range of strate-
gies whose aim was to improve the pay and working conditions in externa-
lized workplaces—essentially raising this market-based benchmark. Thus,
whereas employers were able to manipulate boundaries to gain power over
internal workers’ pay and working conditions, worker representatives pur-
sued strategies to limit that power by extending institutional protections to
externalized groups. Across the cases, we see examples of these strategies.
The unions at BT increased union membership rates among temporary
agency workers through organizing and advocacy work, and they led a series
of campaigns aimed at closing the loopholes in the equal-pay rules for these
workers. At OP, unions successfully opposed management’s plans to intro-
duce lower pay rates for workers transferred to the company’s new call cen-
ter subsidiary in 2010, using member mobilization and protests to improve
their bargaining position.4
TI represents the most successful example of these strategies.
Historically, TI’s major subcontractor, Atesia, employed most of its workers
on temporary ‘‘freelance’’ contracts, with low levels of pay (mainly based on
performance) and lower social contributions. In the early 2000s, following
mounting public pressure and worker protests, union representatives and
the TI management negotiated an agreement in which TI purchased 20%
of Atesia and integrated 1,350 workers into its subsidiary Telecontact, con-
verting all freelance contracts into training positions and agency contracts.
Atesia, however—similar to other subcontractors—continued to employ
many workers on freelance contracts, and the unions started lobbying the
government to restrict their use. In 2006, a new legal ordinance came into
force that required companies to offer inbound call center agents perma-
nent contracts. Atesia subsequently agreed to turn the freelance contracts
of inbound call center agents into permanent part-time contracts at a lower
pay grade (Panici 2013). A second ordinance came into force two years
later that required evidence of ‘‘autonomous work’’ for outbound agents on
freelance contracts. Atesia then agreed to move its 6,000 outbound freelan-
cers to permanent contracts, mainly with part-time or apprenticeship status.
Nevertheless, the company immediately started hiring freelancers again.
The unions responded with a series of strikes and by helping individual
workers bring their cases to court (Info Atesia 2008).
These campaigns had the combined effect of raising pay and improving
working conditions in the call center subcontractor sector and, in
4See Doellgast, Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, and Benassi (2015) for more details on these case studies.
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particular, at a major TI subcontractor. They were also associated with some
internalization of call center work, with minor initial concessions for inter-
nalized workers, which were then mitigated by the union. Thus, this repre-
sents a successful example of worker representatives adopting a series of
strategies to extend negotiated and legal protections to externalized work-
ers, effectively shrinking the cost differential between internal and external
labor.
TI falls squarely in the middle of our framework (Figure 3), with both
moderate cost savings associated with externalization and moderate ease of
exit. The pay for internal TI call center workers is also relatively low and
compressed when compared to the other case study firms (Figure 4). As we
have argued, these conditions make using the benchmarking of costs to
gain concessions more difficult for employers, thus altering the political
dynamics associated with negotiations over the re-internalization of work.
Unions also played a central role in further increasing the costs of external
labor by organizing new groups of workers and constraining exit through
increased internal job security at TI and its subcontractors. Italian unions
were able to achieve these objectives because of the (relatively) encompass-
ing collective bargaining institutions and high union density in externalized
workplaces, as well as through activist leadership by militant unions commit-
ted to pursuing broader equity goals. This demonstrates the importance of
both strategic choices and broader power resources in explaining the differ-
ent outcomes from patterns of contestation over organizational boundaries.
Conclusion
This article contributes to debates in the employment relations literature
concerning the mechanisms connecting labor market and collective bar-
gaining institutions to organizational boundary decisions. We have shown
that cost structures not only influence how employers weigh the efficiency
of alternative boundary decisions but also can affect patterns of contestation
between labor and management associated with changes in boundaries over
time. The outcome of conflicts over boundaries proved to have significant
implications for pay and working conditions. Externalization was most
strongly contested by worker representatives where labor costs differed sig-
nificantly between internal and external workers and where employers
experienced high ease of exit from internal employment relationships.
These conditions were also associated with large concessions from the inter-
nal workforce in exchange for the re-internalization of work.
Our empirical findings are not intended to represent a typology of
national models of contestation that can be generalized across sectors and
workplaces in the countries studied. Instead, the case studies illustrate the
usefulness of the framework that we have developed in this article for ana-
lyzing the effects of heterogeneous national, sectoral, and company-level
institutions on the political dynamics of collective bargaining about
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boundary decisions at the organizational level. This study is the first to
gather equivalent wage data and information on externalization practices
from such closely matched companies across a large number of countries.
Moreover, we focus on an industry in which parallel changes in markets
and ownership encouraged the rapid and radical restructuring of work.
This has given us a unique opportunity to examine the relationship between
cost structures and patterns of contestation over boundary strategies with
some degree of control for competing explanations.
Further research should seek to test the generalizability of the arguments
developed here in other organizational and employment settings. Our find-
ings suggest that, when cost differences are largest between the core and
externalized workplaces and the ability to exit is high, more downgrading of
pay and working conditions will occur over time. These changes are likely
to involve concession bargaining in unionized organizations, but they may
also be expected in workplaces with no or a weak union presence. For
example, Weil (2014) observed similar dynamics in large, non-union U.S.
firms, in which the shift of work into complex networks of suppliers contrib-
uted to increasingly market-driven wage-setting processes. Over time, these
processes lead to downward pressure on pay and working conditions for
workers in easily rationalized jobs, contributing to growing inequality at a
societal level.
More generally, our findings provide empirical support for the argument
that encompassing institutions are a crucial tool for worker representatives
as they seek to preserve high pay and good working conditions in large
firms and across their production chains. In all our case studies, employers
sought to exploit opportunities to reduce labor costs, when they were avail-
able, by moving work across organizational boundaries. In cases in which
cost differences were large and exit options were increasing, unions came
under pressure to reduce the firms’ internal costs through concessions. The
case of TI demonstrates that this is not the only way in which cost differ-
ences between segments can be reduced. TI’s unions were successful in
improving pay and working conditions at call center subsidiaries and some
subcontractors through organizing and legislative campaigns. Worker repre-
sentatives pursued these strategies across the cases. The conditions for suc-
cess were rooted in their ability to mobilize heterogeneous power resources
to increase the costs of externalization and establish new barriers to exit.
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